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Humility and Constraints on O-Language∗
Stephan Leuenberger
According to scientific realism, it is one the ambitions of science to discover the
fundamental properties. If the argument in David Lewis’s “Ramseyan Humility”
is sound, however, that ambition must remain unfulfilled: we are irremediably
ignorant about what these properties are.
That surprising conclusion has already given rise to a sizeable literature, which
includes Langton [2004], Schaffer [2005], Whittle [2006] and Ney [2007]. These
responses discuss Lewis’s ignorance thesis in the light of more general issues in
the theory of knowledge and the metaphysics of properties. In contrast, some of
the semantic assumptions that Lewis relies on have so far received little scrutiny.
In this paper, I aim to make them explicit, and argue that they are false.
“Ramseyan Humility” can be read as continuing a debate about what the
content of scientific theories is. It was once widely held that the vocabulary of
the language of science divides into theoretical and non-theoretical terms. On
this view, the content of the theory is, roughly, given by its Ramsey sentence,
which does not contain any theoretical terms.1 For theoretical terms are taken to
be definable by non-theoretical ones, and definitions, being merely abbreviations,
do not increase the expressive power of a language.
Is such a conception of scientific language and theories compatible with sci-
entific realism? For a scientific realist, it ought to be a substantive claim that a
given scientific theory is true, and there ought to be a fact of the matter about
what entities are referred to by theoretical terms. The so-called model-theoretic
arguments, championed by Hilary Putnam (e.g. in Putnam [1980] and Putnam
[1981]), threaten scientific realism thus construed. They raise the double specter
of triviality and indeterminacy. Triviality, because it seems that every consistent
theory comes out true. Indeterminacy, because a true theory does not seem to
uniquely determine the referents of subsentential expressions. In Lewis [1983a]
and Lewis [1984], Lewis is concerned with the threat of triviality. He argues that
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if only relatively natural, non-disjunctive properties are eligible to be referents,
then there is no danger that every consistent theory comes out true. In Lewis
[forthcoming], he in effect concedes that this move does not help to foil the threat
of indeterminacy. There would not be a unique referent even if only perfectly
natural properties were eligible. Moreover, he proclaimed not to be worried by
such indeterminacy.
In this paper, I do not try to settle whether we ought to endorse Lewis’s
conclusion, and whether we ought to be worried if it were true. Such questions
would lead us deeply into the theory of knowledge and the metaphysics of prop-
erties. My project here is limited to showing that the particular argument for the
indeterminacy that Lewis offers in “Ramseyan Humility” does not work.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 1, I try to pin down the thesis
of Humility that Lewis is arguing for. Section 2 presents a reconstruction of the
argument in deductive form, and clarifies some terminology. Section 3 attacks
what I call “Structuralism,” a premise about the expressive power of our language
minus its theoretical terms. Finally, section 4 considers and criticizes strategies
to rescue Lewis’s argument.
1 The Thesis of Humility
The conclusion of Lewis’s argument is named after a virtue: it is the thesis of
“Humility.”2 But Lewis does not give us a canonical formulation of that thesis.
The first problem in reconstructing the argument is to determine what exactly
its conclusion is. What sort of knowledge concerning fundamental properties and
their roles are we supposed to lack? According to Lewis, we cannot know “the
identity of the properties ...” (p. 12); the “true contingent proposition about
which of the possible realizations is actual” (p. 5/6); and the answer to “the
question: which property occupies the role?” (p. 13).
Examining Lewis’s arguments provides us with a better clue to what the thesis
of Humility is than these formulations do. He offers two different, though closely
related arguments: the Replacement Argument and the Permutation Argument.
The former concludes that we cannot know which ones among the possible fun-
damental properties and relations are actually instantiated. (I assume that for a
fundamental property to exist in a world and for it to be instantiated in a world
are the same thing.) The latter concludes that we cannot know which ones
among the actual fundamental properties play which roles.
I will only analyse the Replacement Argument in detail, but my diagnosis
carries over to the Permutation Argument, mutatis mutandis. The latter deploys
premises that are more likely to be acceptable to certain actualist philosophers.3
However, I set actualist scruples aside in this paper and grant Lewis that we can
freely quantify over non-actual entities. Since the permutation argument does
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not offer advantages other than greater acceptability to actualists, it does not
require separate discussion here.
Lewis allows that Humility may apply to some fundamental properties and
relations but not to others. Perhaps he thinks that it applies to mass and charge,
but not to spatiotemporal distance. But if it applies to F , then it will likewise
apply to every G in the same category as F , if Lewis’s arguments are sound. He
introduces the notion of a category, to which Humility is relativized, as follows:
I speak of ‘fundamental properties’ for short, but they fall into several
categories. There are all-or-nothing monadic properties. There are all-
or-nothing n-adic relations, at least for smallish n. There are properties
that admit of degree, that is, magnitudes; more generally, there are scalar-
valued, vector-valued, tensor-valued, ... magnitudes. There are relational
magnitudes. Maybe my list is too long; maybe the magnitudes could
somehow be reduced to all-or-nothing properties and relations, but that
is a question I shall not take up here. (Lewis [forthcoming, p. 3])
It emerges from Lewis’s discussion that he takes it to be non-contingent what
category a given fundamental property belongs to. For example, if mass is actu-
ally a scalar-valued fundamental property, it could not be vector-valued, or even
a relation, in some other world.
For present purposes, let Humility about category C be the thesis that we
do not know which members of C are actual. On standard views, that S knows
which things are φ implies that S knows that x is φ, if x is one of the things
which are φ. I am assuming here that this is correct.4 Therefore, Humility about
C follows from the claim that for any fundamental property F that belongs to
C, we cannot know that F exists.
2 The Replacement Argument for Humility
Here is a simplified version of the Replacement Argument: Consider a world w
that is just like the actual world @, except that whenever a particular value of mass
is instantiated in a region of actual spacetime, the corresponding value of some
non-actual fundamental property, schmass, is instantiated in the corresponding
region of w. Then we cannot tell whether we are in @ or in w, the argument
goes, and we cannot know that we are in a world where mass is instantiated.
The same point can be made about other putatively fundamental properties: we
can consider a world where charge is replaced by schmarge, and where spin is
replaced by schpin. The Permutation Argument considers a world where mass is
instantiated in all the locations where charge is in the actual spacetime, and vice
versa, and otherwise proceeds much like the Replacement Argument.
Lewis’s actual arguments are more complex than the simplified versions just
given. I present a reconstruction of his Replacement Argument in deductive form.
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While I deviate to some extent from his terminology, I take the reconstruction
to be faithful.5 However, I do not attempt to defend this exegetical claim until
section 3 (3.1).
In my reconstruction, there are three key premises: First, an expressibility
premise: knowledge must be expressible in the language O, to be introduced
below; or more weakly, a knowable proposition must be logically entailed by a
proposition expressible in O. Second, a structuralist premise: O-language cannot
discriminate between worlds with the same structure. Third, a combinatorialist
premise: fundamental properties are recombinable in such a way that there are
distinct possible worlds that have the same structure.
These three claims appear as premises 1), 2), and 3), respectively, in the
following valid argument:
1) If A is knowable, then it is entailed by a true proposition that is expressible
in O.6
2) If A is expressible in O, then it supervenes on fundamental structure.
3) If not every member of category C is actual, and A is a true proposition
that entails that F ∈ C exists, then A does not supervene on fundamental
structure.
4) Not every member of category C is actual.
5) If A is true and entails that F ∈ C exists, A does not supervene on
fundamental structure. (from 3) and 4))
6) If A is true and entails that F ∈ C exists, A is not expressible in O. (from
2) and 5))
7) If A entails that F ∈ C exists, A is not knowable. (from 1) and 6))
The conclusion 7) entails that we cannot know that F exists, for any F ∈ C.
As noted above, this claim in turn entails Humility about C.
The intermediate conclusion 6) is a version of what is sometimes called “quid-
ditism”: the claim that two properties in two different worlds can play exactly
the same role. On one way of cashing out talk of “roles”, two properties share
a role if O cannot distinguish them. According to 6), whatever can be truly said
in O about F in world w is also true about some F ′ in a world w′ where F does
not exist.7
Some of the premises require comment.
Since Humility is relativized to categories, the argument is schematic, and for
all we know, premise 4) may be true for some choices of a category C but not
for others. Perhaps the spatial and the temporal distance relations are the only
4
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members of the category of scalar-valued two-place fundamental relations. If so,
we can know that these relations exist, for all the replacement argument says.
But since we have set actualist scruples aside, we can grant Lewis that premise
4) is true for at least some interesting categories C.
This leaves us with the three substantive premises introduced above: the
expressibility premise 1), the structuralist premise 2), and the combinatorialist
premise 3).
Premise 3) may not initially look like a statement of combinatorialism. How-
ever, it is a consequence of a general combinatorial principle for fundamental
properties and relations. Suppose the antecedent of 3) holds. Then there is
a G, of the same category as F , that is not instantiated in the actual world.
Combinatorialism guarantees that there is a world w in which the fundamental
properties and relations are distributed just like in the actual world, except that
F is throughout “replaced” by G. Then the proposition that F exists is true in
the actual world, but false in the fundamentally isomorphic w, and consequently
does not supervene on fundamental structure. Any proposition that is true and
supervenes on fundamental structure is true in w, and hence does not entail that
F exists. Thus the consequent of 3) holds as well.
Premises 1) and 2) require clarification in two respects. What is it for a
proposition to supervene on fundamental structure? And crucially, what is the
language O? In the rest of this section, I answer the first of these questions, and
discuss the second in a preliminary way. The content of 1) and 2) will be further
clarified in section 3.
What is it for a proposition to supervene on fundamental structure? The
notion of supervenience relevant for premise 2) is global supervenience. A propo-
sition A globally supervenes on fundamental structure if whenever worlds w and
w′ have the same fundamental structure, then the truth-value of A is the same
in w and in w′. What it is to have the same fundamental structure can be
cashed out using the notion of an isomorphism. Let Fw and Fw′ be the classes
of fundamental properties instantiated in w and w′, respectively, and let Dw and
Dw′ be the domains of individuals of these worlds. Then a one-one function f
from Dw ∪ Fw onto Dw′ ∪ Fw′ is a fundamental isomorphism from w to w′ if it
preserves instantiation structure in both directions, i.e. if the following holds for
every x ∈ Dw and X ∈ Fw: x instantiates X in w iff f(x) instantiates f(X) in
w′.8 The existence of a fundamental isomorphism is a necessary and sufficient
condition for worlds to have the same fundamental structure.
Sameness of fundamental structure has been explained in terms of fundamen-
tal properties. While we cannot define what it is for a property to be fundamental,
we can clarify it to some extent. It would be best to start with examples, but
unfortunately, we cannot identify any clear cases. Even supposing that Humility
is false, and that it is thus knowable what the actual fundamental properties are,
5
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it is unlikely to be known at the present stage of inquiry. Lewis conjectures that
mass and charge might be fundamental, and would thus be referred to even in a
final and complete scientific theory of our world. Arguably, some spatiotemporal
relation is fundamental too, but it is not clear exactly which relation. While there
are no clear paradigm cases, there are clear foils. Most properties we ordinarily
talk about, such as being red or being metallic, are non-fundamental. From the
reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, we can conclude that de-
grees of temperature are not fundamental either. Likewise, properties that are
intuitively negative or disjunctive or relational fail to be fundamental. As Lewis
puts it, fundamental properties and relations are “perfectly natural.” Moreover,
part of what it is to be fundamental is to belong to a minimal global supervenience
base for all classes of properties.9
The notion of supervenience on fundamental structure is relatively unprob-
lematic in the context of this argument. More issues will be raised by the question
what the language O, referred to in premises 1) and 2), is supposed to be. As I
noted in the introduction, Lewis is appealing to a distinction between two types
of terms, theoretical and non-theoretical. The language in which the final and
complete theory of the world is stated contains terms of both sorts, and O is the
fragment of that language which does not include the theoretical terms.
What are the non-theoretical terms? Traditionally, they have been taken to
be observational terms. But in Lewis [1970], Lewis proposed that we take ‘O’
to mean ‘old’ rather than ‘observational’. The terms in O are those that are
understood pre-theoretically.
Given its prominent role in the argument, it is surprising how little Lewis says
about what features O is meant to have. Maybe he thought that his argument
is schematic in O, and would be sound for any choice of O that meets the
constraints he explicitly lays down. But as will be shown in detail in section 3, it
is not sound for every such choice, but depends crucially on the expressive power
of O.
What constraints does Lewis impose? He assumes that fundamental prop-
erties are not named in O “except as occupants of roles.” The nature of this
constraint will be discussed in section 3. Further:
I’ll assume ... that O-language does suffice to express all possible
observations, whatever else it may also be able to do. I’ll assume that
O-language is interpreted—never mind how.” (Lewis [forthcoming,
p.3])
Lewis is adamant that he does not impose certain other constraints on O that
one might expect:
‘O’ stands for ‘old’; it is the language that is available to us without
the benefit of the term-introducing theory T . ‘O’ does not stand
6
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for ‘observation’. O-language is not meant to be a ‘pure observation
language’, and indeed I doubt that there could be any such thing...
I do not assume it to be first-order or extensional or finitary or free
of indexicality. Nor do I assume it to be unmetaphysical, suited only
to talk of everyday matters. (pp. 3-4)
After reconstructing Lewis’s replacement argument and clarifying some of its
premises, I will critically examine it in the rest of the paper. I will argue that
2), the structuralist premise, is not explicitly acknowledged by Lewis, let alone
adequately defended. This premise guarantees that a world where the actual
fundamental properties are replaced has the same complete description in the
language O. I will argue that this premise is not just unacknowledged and un-
supported, but also highly implausible.
3 The Structuralist Premise
The achilles’ heel of the Replacement Argument, I claim, is premise 2). I will
refer to it as the thesis of “Structuralism,” despite the fact that this term has
other uses in different philosophical debates:
Structuralism If a proposition is expressible in O, then it supervenes on fun-
damental structure.
Informally, Structuralism can be taken as the doctrine that the language O does
not capture anything over and above the structure of the world.
Does Structuralism have any prima facie plausibility, or if not, is it supported
by theoretical considerations?
Before arguing for a negative answer to this question, I need to make a case
that the Replacement Argument indeed relies on Structuralism, even though
Lewis does not explicitly acknowledge 2) or anything equivalent to it as a premise.
3.1 Lewis’s implicit appeal to Structuralism
To answer the worry that I am reconstructing the argument uncharitably, I will
identify the transition in which 2) must work as a background assumption. While
I claim that Structuralism is indispensable for Lewis’s argument, I do not claim,
of course, that any argument for Humility would have to rely on it.
Lewis deploys the notion of an n-tuple of properties realizing a final and
complete theory T of our world. T itself is not formulated in O: it contains
property names P1, ..., Pn that are not part of O’s vocabulary. If we substitute
these property names with variables, we obtain an open sentence TO which
belongs to O. TO is the matrix of the Ramsey sentence TR of T ; i.e. TR is
7
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existentially quantified with respect to all variables free in TO. To say that an
n-tuple realizes T in a world w is to say that it satisfies the open sentence TO
in w.
In the following passage from Lewis’s statement of the Replacement Argu-
ment, he is in effect trying to establish the intermediate conclusion 6) of my
reconstruction: that no truth expressible in O entails that F exists, since even
a complete theory formulated in O cannot distinguish between a world where F
exists and a world where it has been replaced.
We start with the unique actual realization of T ; all fundamental prop-
erties except idlers and aliens are members of it. If we replace those
properties by others, we get a possible realization by combinatorialism.
(p. 10)10
If σ = 〈F1, ..., Fn〉 is an n-tuple of fundamental properties and relations, a re-
placement σ′ = 〈F ′1, ..., F ′n〉 of σ is an n-tuple such that Fi and F ′i belong to
the same category (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n). If σ consists of all and only the fundamen-
tal properties of w, σ′w is the world fundamentally isomorphic to w where the
members of σ have been replaced by the members of σ′. Combinatorialism guar-
antees that there is such a world; and the fact that the fundamental properties
and relations form a global supervenience base for everything guarantees that it
is unique.11
In the above quote, Lewis is talking about arbitrary replacements, not about
one particular replacement. Hence he is committed to the claim that the actual
world satisfies the following condition, where Tw is the true and complete theory
of world w:
2′) If σ realizes Tw in w, then every replacement σ′ of σ realizes Tw in σ′w.
Note that the consequent asserts that σ′ realizes Tw in σ′w, not merely the
triviality that it realizes Tσ′w in σ
′w.
There might be a different argument for distinct possible realizations of Tw
that relies only on the corresponding existential claim: that there exists at least
one replacment σ′ that realizes Tw in σ′w. However, such an argument would
be different from Lewis’s; I will discuss its prospects in section 4.2.
Is 2′) supposed to reveal a contingent feature of the actual world, or does it
state a condition that all worlds fulfill? In other words, is 2′) to be asserted only
when the actual world is assigned to the variable ‘w’, or is it to be understood
as prefixed by a tacit universal quantifier ‘for all worlds w’?
If one accepted 2′) as true of the actual but not of all worlds, then clearly
some argument would be needed. Otherwise the assertion of 2′) as true of the
actual world is ad hoc. Why should the fundamental structure of the actual
world be enough to fix all O-facts, if the fundamental structure of some other
8
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worlds does not? What is special about the fundamental structure of our world
that precludes O-variation?
Lewis does not engage in any such special pleading on behalf of the actual
world. Indeed, it would be odd for him to do so, given his insistence that we
have no reason to think that the our world is metaphysically distinguished. He
complains against the view that in ours, but not in every world, all fundamental
properties are instantiated: it posits that “our world has a special distinction that
some other worlds lack. Why should the world we happen to live in be special in
this way? Very likely it isn’t” (p. 10).
I will thus assume that Lewis accepts 2′) as a claim about the actual world be-
cause he accepts 2′) as a claim about all worlds. While this assumption simplifies
the discussion in 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, it is dispensable, as I argue in 3.5.
Structuralism is a consequence of universally quantified 2′). Suppose that w
and w′ are fundamentally isomorphic worlds. Then the realization of the true
and complete theory Tw′ of w
′ is a replacement σ′ of the realization σ of the
true and complete theory Tw of w. The sequence σ realizes Tw in w, and by
2′), σ′ realizes Tw in σ′w. Hence TRw is true in both w and σ
′w. Since Tw is a
complete theory, TRw entails every O-sentence that is true in w.
12 Hence exactly
the same O-expressible propositions are true in w and σ′w. Since w and w′
were chosen arbitrarily, this shows that O-expressible propositions cannot differ
among fundamentally isomorphic worlds; that is, they supervene on fundamental
structure.13
After arguing that Lewis’s Replacement Argument does indeed rely on Struc-
turalism, it remains to examine the status of the latter.
3.2 Structuralism is implausible
Clearly, Structuralism is a substantive claim about O: there certainly are pos-
sible languages that can express truths that fail to supervene on fundamental
structure. Suppose that some constant P denotes a fundamental property F
that is instantiated in @. Then the sentence ‘∃x P (x)’ is true in @, but not in a
fundamentally isomorphic world where F has been replaced.14 Hence not every
truth expressible in that language supervenes on fundamental structure.
Lewis rules out that some constant of O denotes a fundamental property,
and has thus nothing to fear from counterexamples of that sort. In 3.4, I discuss
whether his explicit assumptions about O entail Structuralism. Before, I argue
that Structuralism is false if O is anything like our language.
If there are examples of O-expressible differences between structually isomor-
phic possible worlds, the claim that every O-expressible proposition supervenes
on fundamental structure is false. The examples that I will suggest involve ex-
otic examples of fundamental properties and relations, which most of us think
9
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are not instantiated in actuality. This is legitimate in the dialectical context,
since the Replacement Argument explicitly asks us to consider alien fundamental
properties.
However, I can see no reason to think that Structuralism is true when we
restrict our quantifiers in the supervenience claim to worlds that are nearby in
modal space, say to worlds in which no alien fundamental properties are instan-
tiated, or to worlds of a similar complexity as ours. The reason I focus on small
and exotic worlds is that they are much easier to describe. I offer a variety of
examples, each one of which is contentious, and may be rejected by philosophers
with certain theoretical commitments. Nonetheless, pointing to different appar-
ent counterexamples to Structuralism should make it plausible that at least one
of them is a real counterexample.
Example 1: Physical vs. non-physical.
Let wp be a world in which there is just one point-sized particle that
exists for a given period of time, and throughout instantiates the
fundamental property of having a mass of 1 milligram. Let wi be a
world in which there is one point-sized immaterial thing, which exists
for the same amount of time, and instantiates exactly one fundamen-
tal non-physical property. The worlds wp and wi are fundamentally
isomorphic.
Sentences such as “there is a material thing” and “some physical
property is instantiated” express propositions that are true in wp and
false in wi. If either of the terms ‘material’ or ‘physical’ belongs to
the language O, or has a synonym in O, then these propositions can
be expressed in O, and Structuralism is false.
Example 2: Phenomenal differences.
Take your favorite paradigms of a phenomenal experience, say being
in pain and having an experience as of seeing red. Suppose that in
some worlds, things have such experiences not in virtue of having
a complex arrangement of various properties and relations, but in
virtue of instantiating fundamental properties F and G, respectively.
(On some views, this is consistent with physicalism being true in our
world.) Let wF and wG be worlds in which there is just one thing
instantiating one fundamental property, F and G respectively. Then
wF and wG are fundamentally isomorphic.
The sentence “something is in pain” expresses a proposition that is
true in wF and false in wG. If ‘in pain’ or a synonym is in O, then
that proposition can be expressed in O, and Structuralism is false.15
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Example 3: Edenic colour differences.
Let F and G now be what David Chalmers calls “edenic” colour
properties, say perfect red and perfect blue. These are non-actual
fundamental properties, not role properties that need a realizer. As
in Example 2, there is a pair of fundamentally isomorphic worlds that
differ only as to whether F or G is instantiated.16
The sentence “something is red” expresses a proposition true in one
of these worlds but false in the other. If ‘red’ or a synonym is in O,
then that proposition can be expressed in O, and Structuralism is
false.
Examples 1 to 3 involve pairs of fundamentally isomorphic worlds that differ with
respect to which fundamental monadic properties are instantiated. Plausibly,
such pairs might instead differ with respect to which fundamental relations are
instantiated. On Lewis’s view, there are no actual fundamental relations except
spatiotemporal ones. But perhaps there are other fundamental relations in other
possible worlds. To use an example due to Hawthorne [2001], there might be
a perfectly natural relation of attending, such that whether one entity attends
to another is not constrained by the intrinsic properties of the relata or by the
spatiotemporal relations between them. There might be a possible dyadic fun-
damental relation of psychic connection that comes in degrees, and that in some
worlds is distributed isomorphically to distance relations in our world. If we ac-
cept that there could be such fundamental relations, we can construct further
prima facie counterexamples to Structuralism.
Example 4: Non-spatiotemporal fundamental relations
Let wD be a world where there are two things, each instantiating one
fundamental monadic property, at a small distance from each other.
Let wT be a world where there are two non-spatial things, each in-
stantiating one fundamental monadic property, in some fundamental
intentional relation in the same category as distance.17 Then wD
and wT are fundamentally isomorphic.
Then there are sentences, such as “two things are apart from each
other, but close,” that express propositions that are true in wD and
false in wT . If terms like ‘apart’ and ‘close’, or synonyms, are in O,
then such propositions can be expressed in O, and Structuralism is
false.18
It is easy to construct further examples, some more plausible than others. Perhaps
we can even describe a pair of fundamentally isomorphic worlds that have a
different causal structure.19 If there are causal locutions in O, then this will give
11
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rise to further O-expressible propositions that do not supervene on fundamental
structure.
Of course, there are several ways to resist the conclusion that Structuralism
is false. First, for each example it could be objected that I have failed to describe
a pair of possible worlds. Secondly, my semantic ascent could be challenged: the
sentences of English that I mention do not express propositions with different
truth-values in the two worlds. Thirdly, it could be denied that the terms I
mention belong to O.
It turns out that the second and third of these objections are of no help to the
proponent of the Replacement Argument. Explaining why will require a closer
examination at how the argument works, which I provide in 3.3.
The first objection is hard to refute conclusively. Roughly, my claim that the
worlds I described are possible is based on their conceivability and a presumption
that what is conceivable is also possible. Justifying the possibility claims in detail
would involve a general discussion of modal epistemology that is beyond the scope
of this paper. But I think it is fair to say that Lewis, of all philosophers, was
willing to accept that the burden of proof is on those wishing to deny a possibility
claim.20
3.3 A reductio against Structrualism
After offering prima facie counterexamples, I will now present an argument to
the effect that Lewis is committed to reject Structuralism. My case that a given
pair of worlds constituted a counterexample to structuralism has been conditional
on an assumption: that some term of ordinary English belongs to O, or has a
synonym in O. This assumption is hard to justify in a give case, since Lewis has
left us in the dark about what O is. But the critic of the Replacement Argument
has a way around that dialectical difficulty. For that argument has other premises
that do tell us something about O that is in tension with 2). We can then argue
against Structuralism by reductio ad absurdum.
That strategy immediately faces a problem: while the thesis of Humility,
the conlusion of the Replacement Argument, is surprising, it is hardly absurd.
Perhaps there are possible fundamental properties F and G that differ so subtly
that we are in principle unable to know whether F or G is actually instantiated.
Humility is not a suitable basis for a reductio. The key to the reductio strategy
is realizing that the premises of Lewis’s argument do not just entail Humility, but
also another, truly implausible claim. The Replacement Argument proves too
much.
The claim that I take to be absurd is the following:
8) We cannot entertain any proposition that does not supervene on funda-
mental structure.
12
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In other words: we cannot entertain any proposition that is true in one of a pair
of fundamentally isomorphic worlds and false in the other.
In one sense, ‘to entertain A’ means to deliberate about A without com-
mitting yet to either its truth or falsity. The sense in which the expression is
used in 8) is weaker. If you have a propositional attitude towards A, you eo ipso
entertain A.21
There is no reference to O in 8), and it thus can be assessed without know-
ing what O is. An implementation of the strategy now requires two things:
first, showing that the Replacement Argument indeed commits Lewis to 8), and
arguing that 8) is, if not absurd, at any rate false.
The second task has in effect been dispatched already. In 3.2, I tried to
describe worlds that are fundamentally isomorphic yet qualitatively different, and
thereby to express, and to make the reader entertain, propositions that are true
in one but not the other. In so far as I succeeded, I have established that 8) is
false. Which terms are in O, and which ones are not, is neither here nor there.
Thus there remains the first task: showing that the premises of Lewis’s Re-
placement Argument entail 8). Of course, it does not follow from the premises
1), 2), 3) and 4) of my reconstruction in section 2. But that reconstruction was
only as fine-grained as was needed then.
The premises that, jointly with Structuralism, entail 8) are hidden in a sub-
argument for the expressibility premise 1):
1) If A is knowable, then it is entailed by a true proposition that is expressible
in O.
We can reconstruct an argument for premise 1) as follows, where LT is the
language in which the final and complete theory T is formulated:
1a) If A is expressible in LT , it is expressible in O.
1b) If A is entertainable, it is expressible in LT .
1c) If A is knowable, it is entailed by a true entertainable proposition.
From 1a) and 1b), it follows that entertainable propositions are expressible in O.
Together, 1a) - 1c) imply 1).
Crucially for present purposes, premises 1a), 1b) and 2) together imply that
we can only entertain propositions that supervene on fundamental structure, and
hence 8).
Premise 1c) ought to be uncontroversial. Knowledge that p implies belief
that p, and the belief that p implies the entertainability of p, or at least of some
something that entails p.22 It remains for me to show that Lewis is committed
to 1a) and 1b).
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To see why premise 1a) holds, we need to take a closer look at the language
LT in which the hypothesized final and complete theory T of the world is formu-
lated. The language O is just a fragment of LT : in addition to O-terms, LT also
contains T -terms, or “theoretical” terms. In the framework Lewis deploys, T -
terms are introduced, and implicitly defined, by the theory T .23 In Lewis [1970,
section IV], Lewis showed how implicit definitions can be turned into explicit
ones. Explicit definitions are mere abbreviations: they do not increase the ex-
pressive power of the language.24 To be sure, not each term of LT needs to have
a synonym in O. But while some LT -expressible propositions might not find a
succinct expression in O, they will find some expression, however cumbersome.
Hence as a matter of logic, any proposition expressible in LT is also expressible
in O.
To see why premise 1b) holds, we need to recall what role the theory T
plays in the Replacement Argument. T is meant to imply all truths that we
can think or say. If it did not, then we should move to a more comprehensive
theory, and try to run the Replacement Argument for it. Hence LT must be
able to express any proposition that we can express, in natural language or in
scientific language. Indeed, the expressive power of LT must not only match,
but exceed the expressive power of our actual language. The argument is about
limits to what we can know in principle, not about our present epistemic limits.
Premise 1b) would thus not be warranted if LT were an actual language used at
a particular stage in history. All such languages have contingent limitations in
their expressive power that humans might eventually overcome. That something
is not expressible in an actual language at best entails that it fails to be known,
not that it fails to be knowable. Clearly, Lewis allows that LT is idealized, free
from contingent limitations.
I thus conclude that a proponent of the Replacement Argument is committed
to 8). (Though I will briefly reconsider the question in 4.1, when I respond
to an objection.) As I noted, all the examples I gave in 3.2 are prima facie
counterexamples to 8), quite independently of any assumptions about which
terms do or do not appear in O. But I would like to strengthen my case against
8) further by an ad hominem move against Lewis: 8) implies that materialism,
as defined by Lewis himself, is not entertainble. If it is not entertainable, then
it cannot be believed, or disbelieved, or doubted, or argued about—a conclusion
that some philosophers would have welcomed, but certainly not Lewis.
For Lewis, materialism is compatible with modal space including outlandish,
spirit-ridden possible worlds (see Lewis [1983a], Lewis [1999, What Experience
Teaches, pp. 274-5], and Lewis [1999, Reduction of Mind, pp. 291-3]), as long
as they are not in the “inner sphere of possibility” around the actual world. Ac-
cording to his definition, a world is materialistic iff among the worlds in the inner
sphere around it, no two differ without differing in the distribution of physical
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properties.25 The inner sphere of worlds around w consists of those worlds in
which no fundamental properties alien to w exist.26 If all fundamental properties
in a world are physical, then it is materialistic. For the fundamental properties in
any two worlds in the inner sphere are likewise physical, and hence these worlds
do not differ without differing physically. Conversely, if a world is materialistic,
then all its fundamental properties are physical.27 So we can equivalently take
materialism to be true in a world iff all fundamental properties in that world are
physical.28
Surely, there can be physical and non-physical fundamental properties in the
same category. For example, mass is a scalar-valued monadic physical prop-
erty. In some world where dualism is true, pain perhaps is, or is realized by,
a scalar-valued monadic non-physical property. It is now easy to see how the
reductio is completed. A combinatorial principle will imply that there are two
fundamentally isomorphic worlds such that materialism is true in one of them
but not the other.29 Thus materialism, as defined by Lewis, does not supervene
on fundamental structure, and by 8) fails to be entertainable.30
The same sort of argument applies to many other contingent supervenience
claims as well: they fail to be entertainable if 8) is true. Exceptions are provided
only by claims to the effect that all actual fundamental properties and relations
belong to a certain category. The Leibnizian doctrine that all relations supervene
on monadic properties would not be susceptible to the argument, since monadic
properties form their own category and thus cannot be replaced by non-monadic
relations while preserving fundamental structure.31
3.4 Structuralism is unsupported
I have given reasons for rejecting Structuralism. Here I consider whether there are
also reasons to accept it, at least for Lewis. Are there other principles, endorsed
by him, that entail Structuralism? I argue that there are not.
In 3.1, I noted that Structuralism is false if some property constant in O
denotes a fundamental property. In “Ramseyan Humility”, Lewis is explicit that
there are no such constants in O. He writes that “fundamental properties are
not named in O except as occupants of roles” (p. 3). Presumably, a property is
named sans phrase in O if it is denoted by an atomic term, and it is named as
an occupant of a role if it is definable in O by the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method
[Lewis, 1970]. I call this the “anonymity constrant”:
Anonymity constraint No fundamental properties are denoted by atomic O-
terms.32
Given a gloss of O as the non-theoretical part of the language, the anonymity
constraint has some plausibility. Arguably, a term standing for a fundamental
property needs to be a theoretical term.
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Lewis does not impose any further constraints on what sort of properties
could be denoted by atomic terms of O. But does the anonymity constraint
alone entail 2), the structuralist premise? No. Let F and G be fundamental
properties, and suppose that ‘P1’ denotes the conjunction of F and G, or C(F,G)
for short.33 Further, suppose that ‘P2’ denotes C(F,NG) (where NG is the
negation of G), and ‘P3’ denotes C(NF,G). Then an individual has F if and
only if it satisfies ‘P1(x)∨P2(x)’, and an individual has G if and only if it satisfies
‘P1(x) ∨ P3(x)’. Thus these two properties are named in O as the occupiers of
the roles corresponding to these open sentences, but not named in any other way.
Now consider the sentence ‘∃x P1(x)’. This sentence is true in a world in which
some individual has both F and G, but false in a fundamentally isomorphic world
in which G has been replaced by H. Thus Lewis’s anonymity constraint does
not guarantee the truth of 2).
Are there plausible stronger constraints that do entail 2)? Does Structuralism
follow from a principle in the same spirit as the anonymity constraint?
A natural candidate is the following:
Strong anonymity constraint No Boolean combinations of fundamental prop-
erties and relations are denoted by atomic O-terms.
It is easy to see that this constraint does not entail 2) either. Suppose a pair of
individuals satisfies ‘P4(x, y)’ if and only if the first has F and the second has G.
The term ‘P4’ denotes a two-place relation which is not a Boolean combination
of monadic fundamental properties like F and G. Then again, O can distinguish
between fundamentally isomorphic worlds: ‘∃xyP4(x, y)’ is true in world with
two individuals, one of which has F and one of which has G, but false in another
world where G is replaced by H.
The strong anonymity constraint only bans properties definable from funda-
mental ones by the application of Boolean operators. We can formulate an even
stronger condition:
Ultrastrong anonymity constraint If a property or relation is definable
from the class of fundamental properties and relations using identity and
(finitary and infinitary) quantifiers and Boolean operators, it is not denoted
by an atomic O-term.34
However, this constraint does not imply 2) either. For a counterexample, con-
sider two worlds w and w′ of two-way infinite recurrence which are fundamentally
isomorphic, but where F is instantiated in w wherever F ′ is in w′. Suppose G
is a non-fundamental property such that for one epoch in w, G is had only by
individuals in that epoch in w, and by no individuals in w′. Since not even infini-
tary logical resources would enable us to define G from fundamental properties
and relations, the ultrastrong anonymity constraint allows G to be denoted by
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an atomic O-term ‘P ’. Then the sentence ‘∃xP (x)’ expresses a proposition
that fails to supervene on fundamental structure. (We do not have to assume
anything about how G is distributed in worlds other than w and w′. It may
apply to everything in the actual world, and to nothing in worlds fundamentally
isomorphic to it.)
A supporter of Structuralism may try to rule out such counterexamples. She
could deny that there are highly “unnatural” properties like G, insisting that
properties are relatively sparse. But this strategy is unpromising, for the ultra-
strong anonymity constraint is independently implausible. The only properties
that it allows to be denoted by atomic O-terms are of a very special sort: they
are symmetry-breakers. Some worlds have symmetries in the distribution of their
fundamental properties: they may be spatially symmetric, or there may be two-
way eternal recurrence. If w is such a symmetric world, there are fundamental
isomorphisms from w to itself that do not map every individual to itself. A prop-
erty F is a symmetry-breaker iff there is a world w, an individual x in w, and a
fundamental isomorphism µ from w to itself such that x has F and µ(x) does
not. The only properties that cannot be defined from the fundamental properties
and relations using infinitary resources are symmetry-breakers.35
But the claim that only symmetry-breakers are denoted by an atomic O-term
presents a dilemma. Either no properties at all are denoted by atomic O-terms,
or some are. The first horn is clearly unacceptable, for it entails that O consists
of logical vocabulary only.36 We need to remember that O is the language in
which our complete theory is formulated. Everything we can say is expressible in
O, and we are clearly not restricted to logical vocabulary. The second horn leaves
us with a mystery in foundational semantics. Plausibly, symmetry-breakers are
among those properties that we cannot pick out, either by atomic or by defined
terms. How can we denote any property that applies to horses in epoch e but
not to horses in epoch e′ in some world of two-way eternal recurrence? If atomic
terms can achieve the feat of picking them out, why do they not manage the
apparently lesser feat of picking out properties that do not break symmetries?
The ultrastrong anonymity constraint is most plausible under the assumption
that the actual world displays symmetries in the distribution of fundamental
properties. Perhaps our atomic O-terms apply to things in our vicinity, but not
to things in symmetrically related, but spatially or temporally distant parts of our
world. But then the inference to Structuralism can only be secured by further
ad hoc assumptions. Suppose that in the actual world, individual x is in the
extension of atomic O-terms ‘P ’ and ‘Q’, while none of the individuals to which
it is symmetrically related is. Let w be fundamentally isomorphic to @, and let
X be the class of those individuals in the domain of w which are mapped to x by
some fundamental isomorphism from w to @. Then Structuralism implies that
there is exactly one member y of X which is in the extension of ‘P ’ in w; and
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that that very y is also the only member of X that is in the extension of ‘Q’ in
w. But which member of X is this “favourite counterpart” of x? Any answer
seems entirely arbitrary.
As this discussion indicates, there is little prospect of deriving Structural-
ism from some independently plausible strengthened version of the anonymity
constraint.
Should we consider Structuralism to be a consequence of principles which
Lewis articulates in other papers, and which might work as a background as-
sumption in “Ramseyan Humility”? Of course, there is no space here to con-
clusively establish the negative existential claim that there is no such principle.
Nonetheless, I want to mention an example of a claim from which Structuralism
might be thought to follow, but does not, as a moment’s reflection shows.
If we are speaking loosely, we might express Lewis’s well-known doctrine of
Humean supervenience by saying that “everything supervenes on fundamental
structure.” But Structuralism as understood here emphatically does not follow
from Humean supervenience. Roughly, the latter is the thesis that if two worlds
have the same fundamental properties instantiated in corresponding spacetime-
points, they do not display any qualitative differences [Lewis, 1986b].37 Evidently,
it does not follow that if two worlds have different fundamental properties, but
arranged in the same way, they do not display any qualitative differences. An
analogy: the claim that no two mosaics differ in their aesthetic properties if they
consist of the same arrangement of stones is very different, and much weaker,
than the claim that no two mosaics differ in their aesthetic properties if they
have isomorphic arrangements of stones, even if blue stones have been swapped
throughout for red ones and vice versa.38
3.5 Does Contingent Structuralism help?
In 3.1, I noted a caveat regarding my reconstruction of the Replacement Argu-
ment. Strictly speaking, Lewis only needs that the following condition is satisfied
by the actual world, not that it is satisfied by every possible world (Tw is the true
and complete theory of world w):
2′) If σ realizes Tw in w, then every replacement σ′ of σ realizes Tw in σ′w.
I showed that 2), i.e. Structuralism, follows from the assumption that 2′) is
satisfied by every world, and went on to argue against that premise. Using the
same reasoning as in 3.1, we can show that the following weaker claim follows
from the assumption that 2′) is satisfied by the actual world:
Contingent Structuralism If A is expressible in O, then it has the same
truth-value in all worlds fundamentally isomorphic to the actual world.
18
Humility and Constraints on O-Language 3.5
The argument to the conclusion 7) then goes through if we substitute all oc-
curences of “supervenes on fundamental structure” with “has the same truth-
value in all worlds fundamentally isomorphic to the actual world”.
I will use the convenient name “Contingent Structuralism” even though it
is not quite accurate. The above claim does not imply that anything is contin-
gent; it merely fails to imply that it is necessary that the fundamental structure
determines the complete O-description.
In 3.1, I argued that we should not assume that the actual world satisfies
2′) unless we are assuming that all worlds do. In other words, we should accept
Contingent Structuralism only qua consequence of Structuralism, if at all. Other-
wise, we are claiming that the actual world is in some basic respect special. Lewis
himself has warned us from such actualocentrism. A version of the Replacement
Argument that appeals to Contingent Structuralism as an unsupported premise
is thus dialectically weak.
Nonetheless, it is worth asking whether we have good reason to think that
Contingent Structuralism is false. I want to argue that the case against Struc-
turalism undermines Contingent Structuralism as well.
The discussion in 3.4 carries over without change. The anonymity constraint
and its stronger cousins all appear to be either extremely implausible, or else do
not entail Contingent Structuralism.
The discussion in 3.3 carries over with only minor change. Given a sufficient
supply of both physical and non-physical fundamental properties and relations in
the actually instantiated categories, we can argue that there are both materialistic
and non-materialistic worlds among those that are fundamentally isomorphic to
the actual world. Thus Contingent Structuralism, together with 1a) and 1b), also
implies that materialism is not entertainable. Again, the retreat to Contingent
Structuralism does not help.
However, some comment is required about how the discussion in 3.2 applies to
Contingent Structuralism. The counterexamples to Structuralism involved “toy”
worlds with a very simple structure. It is of course much harder to describe pairs
of worlds which share the enormous complexity of the actual world.
Nonetheless, as I noted in 3.2, I do not find it in the least plausible that
O-differences among fundamentally isomorphic should be restricted to worlds of
low complexity. Indeed, it seems to me that ideas from the previous examples
can be used to describe a world w that is fundamentally isomorphic but O-
discernible from the actual world. To adapt example 1: For any actual individuals
having a determinate of mass, there are individuals in w having a corresponding
determinate fundamental non-physical property; and likewise for other actual
fundamental properties. Then sentences such as “there is a material thing” and
“some physical property is instantiated” express propositions that are true in
@ and false in w. If either of the terms ‘material’ or ‘physical’ belongs to the
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language O, or has a synonym in O, then these propositions can be expressed in
O, and Contingent Structuralism is false.
One might worry whether individuals that do not have physical properties can
stand in spatiotemporal relations. Arguably, angels would fit that description. If
their possibility is not accepted, one would have to introduce non-spatiotemporal
fundamental relations as well, as in example 4. This confirms what I said before:
more complex worlds require a more complex discussion. Nonetheless, there
is little hope for the proponent of the Replacement Argument that Contingent
Structuralism can be salvaged from the wreckage of Structuralism.
4 Objections considered
So far, I have been on the attack, criticizing the Replacement Argument by un-
dermining its second premise. In this section, I switch to defense. I consider three
objections to the effect that the Replacement Argument can be reconstructed in
such a way that it is not vulnerable to my criticism. In response, I argue that it
does not fare better on these alternative reconstructions.
4.1 Unknowability without Inexpressibility?
The reductio argument against Structuralism depends on 1a)-1c). But surely,
someone not committed to those premises might still advance a variant of the
Replacement Argument? She might support premise 1) in some other way. Even
expressible propositions may be unknowable, after all. Another necessary condi-
tion for the knowability of p is that we could have justification to believe it, and
we can arguably only have such justification if we have evidence for p. Perhaps
there could not be any evidence for those propositions not expressible in O. This
line of thought suggests the following alternative sub-argument for premise 1):
1a′) If A is knowable, it is entailed by a true proposition that we could have
evidence for.
1b′) If A is not expressible in O, we could not have evidence for it.
Given a language O, we can distinguish two characters who may run the Re-
placement Argument, whom I call the “expressive skeptic” and the “evidential
skeptic.” The expressive skeptic denies that we can express, or entertain, any
propositions that are not expressed by a sentence of O. Anything not translat-
able into that idiom is unintelligible to her. The evidential skeptic grants that
we can think and speculate about many questions that cannot be asked in O.
But she insists that such speculation is entirely idle, since there could not be any
evidence that favoured one answer over another one.
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My reductio from 3.3 works only against an expressive skeptic, who appeals
to premises 1a)-1c) in addition to 2)-4). It has no force against an evidential
skeptic. This raises the question whether the Replacement Argument is effective
in the hands of the evidential skeptic.
The answer is negative, for the reasons laid out in Schaffer [2005]. If we
can express different hypotheses about what the actual fundamental properties
are, but O cannot express them, then so much the worse for the claim that
only O-expressible propositions could bear on whether we should believe these
hypotheses. Schaffer points out that the evidential skeptic’s Replacement Argu-
ment is just another skeptical argument of the kind familiar from the tradition.
He then argues that any epistemological theory that has a response to skepticism
can likewise disarm that particular argument.39
What about the exegetical question: is the author of “Ramseyan Humility”
an expressive skeptic or an evidential skeptic? I already argued in 3.3 that he is
an expressive skeptic. Lewis explicitly states that all terms in LT are either also
in O or defined in terms of O by the theory T . Hence he is committed to accept
1a), i.e. that the expressive power of LT does not exceed the expressive power of
O. Moreover, he explicitly takes T to be a complete theory. The intended sense
of completeness is that it answers all the questions we can think of. (It is not
meant to be complete in the sense of implying every true proposition; otherwise,
its completeness would be incompatible with 6).) Thus Lewis is committed to
1b) as well.
When taken in isolation, some passages in Lewis [forthcoming] may suggest
that Lewis is an evidential skeptic:
O-language, we assumed, is rich enough to express all possible ob-
servations. Therefore any predictive success for T is equally a pre-
dictive success for the Ramsey sentence of T. Since the evidence for
T consists of its record of predictive success, there is no way to gain
evidence for T that is not equally evidence for the Ramsey sentence.
...
There is indeed a true contingent proposition about which of the
possible realizations is actual, but we can never gain evidence for
this proposition, and so can never know it. If there are multiple
possible realizations, Humility follows. (p. 5/6)
But Lewis also makes clear that the allegedly unknowable propositions are not
entertainable:
We cannot answer the question: which property occupies that role?
But worse: not only can we not answer that question, we can’t even
ask it. (p. 16)
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An answer to that question would be the sort of proposition that the thesis of
Humility claims to be unknowable: one that is true only in worlds in where some
fundamental property F is instantiated (and plays a given role), but not in worlds
where F is replaced by a distinct G.
The passages above do not show that Lewis is an evidential skeptic. We
should note that anyone who is committed to 1a)-1c) will also accept 1a′) and
1b′), and is thus entitled to use the sub-argument for 1) presented in this section.
For premise 1a′) is uncontroversial if we take ‘evidence’ broad enough. Moreover,
for a fixed O, 1b′) seems weaker than the conjunction of 1a) and 1b)—we could
not have evidence for a proposition that is not entertainable, presumably. Given
that an expressive skeptic has the stronger commitments, she can still assent to
these premises. Thus the hypothesis that the author of “Ramseyan Humility” is
an expressive skeptic is not at odds with what he says in these passages.
4.2 Replacing the structuralist premise?
In my reconstruction, Lewis relies on Structuralism, the thesis that any two
fundamentally isomorphic worlds are O-indiscernible. However, a weaker premise
in place of Structuralism would still yield a valid argument for Humility: that
among those non-actual worlds that are fundamentally isomorphic to the actual
world, some are O-indiscernible from it.
Here is the idea. What O-expressible propositions are true at a world depends,
in general, on two things: what fundamental structure the world exhibits, and
what fundamental properties and relations are at the nodes of that structure.
Thus replacing a fundamental property in a structure sometimes results in an
O-difference. But it need not always make a difference, for all that has been
said. The new argument relies on the claim that if a property can be replaced
at all, there are some possible replacements that leave the O-truths unaffected;
instead of a universal premise, it uses an existential premise.
For comparison with the old one, I present this new argument in deductive
form as well. The new, weaker premise 2*) is here formulated in terms of en-
tailment and supervenience on fundamental structure. All the other lines are the
same as in the reconstruction in section 2:
1) If a proposition is knowable, then it is entailed by a true proposition that
is expressible in O.
2*) If the existence of F is not entailed by any true proposition that super-
venes on fundamental structure, it is not entailed by a true O-expressible
proposition either.
3) If not every member of category C is actual and a true proposition entails
that F ∈ C exists, it does not supervene on fundamental structure.
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4) Not every member of category C is actual.
5) If a true proposition entails that F ∈ C exists, it does not supervene on
fundamental structure. (from 3) and 4))
6) If a true proposition entails that F ∈ C exists, it is not expressible in O.
(from 2*) and 5))
7) If a proposition entails that F ∈ C exists, it is not knowable. (from 1) and
6))
Premise 2*) can be paraphrased as follows: if there are fundamentally isomorphic
worlds that differ with respect to the existence of F , then at least two of them
are O-indiscernible.
Although valid, the new Replacement Argument is dialectically ineffective as it
stands. Premise 2*) says, roughly, that if combinatorialism holds, quidditism does
too. But in the context of the argument, the transition from combinatorialism to
quidditism is at issue. Suppose you are a combinatorialist, but cannot see why
your view is committed to any claim about expressibility, or about the language
O. In particular, you wonder why it is committed to the version of quidditism
expressed by 6). Why should you be swayed to endorse quidditism by an argument
that appeals to 2*)?
Premise 2*) is not a natural fall-back position once 2) is given up. An analogy:
Suppose I think that all leaves in a garden are exactly qualitatively identical.
Perhaps I hold this as a default assumption; or I accept it as a consequence
of the claim that all features of a leaf are determined by its genetic make-up,
and the claim that all leaves are genetically the same. If I am then presented
with examples of qualitatively distinct leaves, the existential claim that there is
at least one pair of qualitatively identical leaves is not automatically a natural
fall-back position for me. A special argument would be needed.
How could one go about arguing for this existential claim? In the analogy,
three strategies come to mind. First, the way of example: finding two leaves
that prove to be exact duplicates under microscopic scrutiny. Second, the way
of grouping : arguing that all oak tree leaves must be qualitatively identical, and
that there are several oak tree leaves in the garden. Third, the way of counting :
arguing that given the ratio of the number of leaves in the garden to the number
of possible qualitative variations among leaves, it is certain, or at least probable,
that some leaves are qualitatively identical.
In the case of the new Replacement Argument, there is likewise a special ar-
gument needed for premise 2*), if it is not accepted qua consequence of 2). Can
any of the three strategies be deployed successfully to argue for 2*)? The way of
examples might seem promising: does permutation of negative charge and posi-
tive charge not result in an O-indiscernible world; and is there not an (arguably
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alien) property, negative mass, that could take the place of mass without giving
rise to O-differences?
This suggestion seems to presuppose that we can refer to mass and charge,
and that we know of them that they are fundamental. It may thus threaten
to deliver a Phyrric victory in the battle for premise 2*), which results in the
loss of the war to save the argument. But even if if it is granted that such
presuppositions can be avoided, the suggestion still faces a dilemma.
Is there one fundamental property of electric charge which takes both positive
and negative real values? Or are positive and negative electric charge distinct
fundamental properties that both take positive real values, and that nomologically
exclude each other in the actual world?40
On the first horn, we do not have a pertinent example: rather than a permu-
tation or replacement of a fundamental property that leaves O-truths unaffected,
we would only have a permutation (in the case of charge) or replacement (in the
case of mass) of values of one and the same fundamental properties that leaves
O-truths unaffected. The possibility of permutations and replacements of the
latter sort is much less striking, and does not lead to Humility as characterized
by Lewis.
On the second horn, positive charge and negative charge are distinct funda-
mental properties in the same category. A combinatorial principle such as the
one invoked by Lewis will thus apply to them. Hence there will be pairs of worlds
w and w′ of the following sort: in w, everything has two units of positive charge
and one unit of negative charge; and w′ is exactly like w except that everything
has two units of negative charge and one unit of positive charge. The worlds w
and w′ are fundamentally isomorphic. Are the same O-sentences true in them? I,
for one, am finding it extremely hard to develop intuitions about this. Perhaps w
and w′ are O-indiscernible, and perhaps they are not. But at any rate, the claim
that they are O-indiscernible cannot be supported by pointing out that positive
and negative charge play symmetrical roles in the fundamental laws of our world.
For on the hypothesis being considered, these laws are entirely contingent, and
will fail in w or w′.
Does the way of grouping fare better? Presumably, the class of physical
properties is the most promising candidate for a sub-class of the fundamental
properties for which a restricted version of Structuralism holds. But are the
physical fundamental properties really such that their exchange in a structure
does not result in O-differences? Consider again a world where positive charge
is instantiated wherever mass is in the actual world, and vice versa, and all
other fundamental properties are distributed as they actually are. Such a world
is presumably incompatible with actual laws, but combinatorialism implies its
metaphysical possibility. Is there a desk in the region corresponding to the region
that my desk occupies? Is it heavy, as is my desk? I have no idea what features
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the thing in that region has. Why should I think that it is heavy? If it is not,
then the way of grouping fails for the class of physical properties.
Philosophers have made various proposals about what the distinguishing
marks of physical as opposed to non-physical fundamental properties are. But as
far as I know, it has not been suggested that physical properties can be permuted
with and can replace other physical properties without making a difference to the
O-description of a world; and that replacing them with non-physical properties,
in contrast, may make for an O-difference. The strategy asks the distinction
between physical and non-physical properties to bear more weight than it can
carry. If premise 2*) is to be supported by the way of grouping, we would need
to be told more about physical properties than we have been so far.
Finally, the way of counting. The idea here is that there are so many different
fundamental properties that there are not enough O-roles to distinguish them all.
To be sure, actual languages have only limited resources, and would not be able
to distinguish all fundamentally isomorphic worlds, if there are sufficiently many.
But it is clear that Lewis allowed us to idealise away from that sort of limitation
of O. Hence the way of counting does not seem promising.
To emphasize again, I am not claiming that 2*) is false, nor that no good
argument in its favour could be given. I consider it to be an interesting and diffi-
cult question whether 2*) is true, a question best approached with a substantive
metaphysical conception of what fundamental properties are. What I insist on
here is merely that no argument for 2*) is implicit in “Ramseyan Humility”, or
indeed in other publications of Lewis.
4.3 Two-Dimensionalism to the Rescue?
My reconstruction of the Replacement Argument presupposes that there is a
functional relation of expression between sentences and propositions. I often
talk about “the proposition expressed” by a sentence, or about propositions
“expressible in O.” It may be objected that this is problematic. Lewis himself
appeals to what is called “two-dimensionalism” in a later stage of the paper,
and according to two-dimensionalism, there are two salient expression relations
between sentences and propositions, which we may call “primarily expressing”
and “secondarily expressing.” Does this distinction undermine my criticism of
the Replacement Argument?
Lewis invokes two-dimensionalism in response to the following objection. Let
T (P1, ..., Pn) be the true and complete theory of @, in a given (finite or infinite)
axiomatization, and grant that T ’s Ramsey-sentence TR =
∃X1...∃XnT (X1, ..., Xn)
is likewise true in worlds that are fundamentally isomorphic with @. Then
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∃X1...∃Xn[T (X1, ..., Xn)∧ Actually T (X1, ..., Xn)]
is false in worlds where fundamental properties have been been permuted or
replaced relative to the actual world. Indeed, that sentence expresses a maximally
strong proposition which is true only in @ (and other worlds indiscernible from
it, if there are any). If it belongs to O, the structuralist premise is false.
Lewis responds by distinguishing ways in which a proposition is expressed by
a sentence. Instead of claiming that we do not have sentences that express an
answer to the question which fundamental properties are actual, he claims that
we have no sentences “that express those alternative answer-propositions, and do
so in such a way that we can know which sentence expresses which proposition”
[Lewis, forthcoming, p. 15]). A footnote makes clear that he is appealing to
two-dimensional semantics. For him, it is the primary intension that is expressed
“in such a way that we can know which sentence expresses which proposition.”41
‘Expressible’, as I have used it, ought to be understood as “expressible qua
primary proposition of a sentence or thought,” and 2) should be understood as
2′):
2′) If a proposition is the primary intension of a sentence of O, it supervenes
on fundamental structure.
This move foils the above objection, since the proposition that is true in @ but
not in the fundamentally isomorphic worlds is only expressed as the secondary
intension of the above sentence. Adding a rigidifying operator such as ‘Actually’
makes no difference at all to the primary proposition associated with a sentence.42
Consider “Things are as they actually are,” or “Every proposition is true if
and only if it is actually true.” The primary intensions of these sentences are
necessary, while the secondary intensions are true and maximally strong. There
is a good sense in which these sentences are uninformative and do not imply
answers to questions about our world. Lewis seems at least prima facie justified
in insisting that the primary intension is the relevant one for the Replacement
Argument.
Does the substitution of 2′) for 2) blunt my objections? The sentences I
suggested as potential counterexamples are “there is a material thing”, “some
physical property is instantiated”, “something is in pain”, “something is red”,
and “two things are apart from each other, but close”. None of them involves
a rigidifying operator. Thus it appears that replacing 2) by 2′) is of no help.
But a proponent of the Replacement Argument might argue that the primary
intension of these sentences does after all diverge from the secondary intension,
and that only the latter differs between isomorphic worlds. On one strategy, she
would posit hidden structure: the logical form of the above sentences involves
rigidfiying operators. Perhaps ‘pain’ is to be understood as a rigidified definite
description, roughly as ‘state actually playing role R’, where R would need to
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be specified. On another strategy, the proponent of the Replacement Argument
would generalize two-dimensionalism: the primary and secondary intension may
diverge even in the absence of any overt or hidden rigidifying operators. I will
argue that neither strategy promises to rescue the argument.
Pursuing the hidden-structure strategy in effect amounts to redrawing the
boundary between the old and the new terms in the language. Lewis seems
to tell us that O may contain all but the most obviously theoretical terms, i.e.
those that pick out fundamental properties, and that no assumptions are made
about its semantics. But the hidden-structure move is effectively treating the
terms used in my examples as theoretical terms, in the sense of terms that are
introduced by description via the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method. It thus relies
on strong claims about the structure of O. Moreover, some of the claims needed
to defuse my examples are highly implausible. Notoriously, pain does not seem
to be definable as the actual realizer of a role.
The generalization strategy could be developed in many different ways. We
would need to be told what the primary intension of a sentence S is, if it is not
just what is expressed by S ′, where S ′ results from deleting rigidifying operators in
S. Even if this could be done, it might fail to rescue the Replacement Argument
for at least three reasons. First, the primary and secondary intensions might
not diverge for all terms, and counterexamples to the structuralist premise could
be constructed from those terms for which they coincide.43 Secondly, primary
intensions may themselves distinguish between isomorphic worlds, and hence
not be of any use in the defence of Structuralism. Thirdly, the Replacement
Argument might fail even if primary intensions are characterized in such a way
that 2′) is satisfied, and thus deserve to be called “structural intensions.” For
once premise 2) has been replaced by 2′), the argument only goes through with
a compensating change in the first premise, from 1) to 1′):
1′) If A is knowable, then it is entailed by a true proposition that is primarily
expressible in O.
It might be plausible that knowledge must be expressible, but why should it be
expressible qua primary intension of a sentence? Here is an ineffective argument
for that claim: Since structural intensions can never differ between epistemically
indiscernible worlds, and since fundamentally isomorphic worlds are epistemically
indiscernible, structural intensions can never differ between fundamentally iso-
morphic worlds. It is clear why such a defense would not be of any use to the
proponent of the Replacement Argument. The claim that all fundamentally iso-
morphic worlds are epistemically indiscernible is not pre-theoretically obvious; I,
for one, find it prima facie little more attractive than the claim that isomorphic
mosaics look the same. Moreover, the claim is rather close to the thesis of Hu-
mility. If there were independent support for it, it would threaten to make the
Replacement Argument redundant. If there is no independent support, then the
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Replacement Argument might be described as circular, or begging the question,
or failing to transmit warrant, depending on what your favorite diagnostic tool
is. In any case, it would be dialectically ineffective.
I conclude that a two-dimensionalist defence of the Replacement Argument is
undermotivated. Of course, I cannot show that no modification of that argument
succeeds. But the prospects are dim. In contrast, I do not take Humility, the
conclusion, to be too implausible. What I hope to have established here is that
if we accept Humility, it ought not to be on the basis of Lewis’s Replacement
Argument.
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Notes
1Alternatively, the content of the theory is given by a variant of the Ramsey sentence that
replaces existential quantifiers with uniqueness quantifiers (∃!). I will disregard subtleties that
arise if a theory has more than one realization in the same world.
2Lewis borrows ‘humility’ as a philosophical term of art from Langton [1998], who uses it
to label an ignorance claim she attributes to Kant. Psillos [2006] was independently inspired
by Langton to coin the expression “Ramseyan Humility” for a similar thesis he attributes to
Ramsey.
3For example, David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility [Armstrong, 1989]
would license an argument from permutation, but not from replacement.
4For critical examination of that thesis, see Schaffer [2007].
5It is faithful, but not maximally fine-grained. There are sub-arguments for some of the
premises that I skip over here. This will become relevant in 3.3 below.
6An item of terminological book-keeping: in my usage, a false proposition A is not knowable,
even if there is a possible world where it is not just true, but known by subjects in that world.
7Unfortunately, the term “quidditism” has different uses; and in “Ramseyan Humility”,
Lewis himself uses it in a non-standard way. The claim he calls “quidditism” is already a trivial
consequence of the claim that I call “combinatorialism”.
8Here as elsewhere in the paper, I speak of properties rather than properties and rela-
tions, for the sake of simplicity. The definition of a fundamental isomorphism given here can
straightforwardly be extended to relations.
If we are using the framework of centered possible worlds, then a fundamental isomorphism
is also required to map the center of w to the center of w′.
9I here ignore the epistemic possibility, mentioned by Lewis in footnote 4, that there is no
minimal supervenience base.
10For Lewis, a fundamental property is an idler at a world if it does “not play an active part
in the workings of nature” (p. 3) of that world.
11I am here ignoring irrelevant complications due to idlers.
12“What we need to know about the Ramsey sentence is that it logically implies exactly the
O-language sentences that are ... logically implied by the postulate of T” [Lewis, forthcoming,
p.4]. The postulate of T is what I am just calling ‘T ’. Since it is complete, any sentence is
either logically entailed or logically incompatible with it.
13The same comments apply, mutatis mutandis, to Lewis’s statement of the permutation
argument: “Suppose we have the actual realization of T . Maybe some members of the n-
tuple that realizes T are not fundamental properties, or maybe some belong to single-membered
categories. Hold those ones fixed. Permute the rest within their categories to obtain a new
n-tuple. It too would realize T .” (p. 5)
14‘P (x)’ here abbreviates ‘x instantiates P ’. I take O to be a first-order language with
singular terms for both individuals and properties, and with instantiation predicates (an n+ 1-
place predicate for n-adic relations) as part of its logical vocabulary.
15The assumption that ‘in pain’ or a synonym is in O is entirely compatible with the
anonymity constraint, discussed in 3.4. The term does not “name” F ; it applies to prop-
erties other than F as well. Hence the assumption carries no commitment to the so-called
“identification thesis” that Lewis rejects in the last section of Lewis [forthcoming].
16Chalmers [2006, pp. 79-80] tentatively concludes that worlds with such edenic color
properties are possible.
17It could be objected that on Lewis’s theory of possible worlds, it is arguably necessary
that there is spacetime structure, such that there could not be a world such as w. However,
Lewis is explicit that his replacement argument is not supposed to be hostage to his views
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about possible worlds. Indeed, the argument would be of much more limited interest if it were
presupposing these views.
18In fact, Lewis’s anonymity constraint, discussed in 3.4, does not look all that plausible for
fundamental spatial, temporal, or spatiotemporal relations. I will not develop that objection
here, though.
19This would be entirely compatible with the supervenience of causation on fundamental
properties and relations, a point that will be further explained in 3.4. In particular, it is also
compatible with Lewis’s accounts of causation in terms of counterfactuals and indirectly in
terms of laws of nature. Fundamentally isomorphic worlds may not have isomorphic laws,
for the comparison of candidate systems in terms of strength may be sensitive to what the
fundamental properties are. Likewise, similarity orderings among worlds, which determine
which counterfactuals are true, may be sensitive to what the fundamental properties are.
20To echo Zimmerman [1999, p. 213]: “I am fortunate to have Lewis for challenger ...:
Lewis ... is willing to take the fact that something seems plainly possible as weighty evidence
for its actually being possible—not just ‘epistemically possible’, i.e. true for all we know right
now.”
21Of course, it is a vexed question under what conditions one counts as having an attitude
to a proposition. Clearly, not every relation to a proposition qualifies, but only fairly natural
relations of the right kind. I will not attempt an analysis of what it is to have an attitude
towards a proposition. While hard to analyse, the notion is understood reasonably well.
One can replace ‘entertainable’ by ‘expressible’ if preferred. It is an interesting question
whether some propositions are entertainable but not expressible, but we can abstract from it
for the purpose of the argument.
22Since every proposition entails itself, 1c) is weaker than the claim that every knowable
proposition is entertainable.
23“The language of T contains T-terms: theoretical terms implicitly defined by T. And there
is all the rest of our language, call it O-language.” (p. 3)
24Sometimes, this is expressed by saying that definitions need to satisfy an eliminability
constraint. For discussion of logical features of definitions, see for example Suppes [1957] and
Belnap [1993].
25This definition takes ‘being physical’ as a term for a second-order property that is primitive,
i.e. unanalysed. Of course, Lewis does have things to say about it.
26Maybe not even all of those worlds are in the inner sphere; see Lewis [1994, section 1].
That issue does not bear on the present discussion.
27Suppose a world w has a non-physical fundamental property F . By a combinatorial
principle, there is a world that differs from w in the distribution of F but not in the distribution
of physical fundamental properties. Hence w is not materialistic.
28Lewis himself uses a formulation of that sort in Lewis [1999, Reduction of Mind, p.292]:
“[A]ll fundamental properties and relations that actually occur are physical. This is the thesis
of materialism.”
29Since combinatorialism needs to be appealed to here, could the argument be construed
as a reductio of combinatorialism rather than Structuralism? In principle, this is a theoretical
option. But it is a very unattractive one, because the reductio requires something far weaker
than a general combinatorial principle for fundamental properties. What is needed is only that
physical and non-physical fundamental properties can be instantiated in worlds with the same
fundamental structure, which is a weak combinatorial principle indeed.
30An objection: This argument only goes through if it is assumed that the second-order-
property of being physical is essential to every property that has it, i.e. that no property can
be physical in one world and non-physical in another. But this is a fair assumption to make,
since Lewis’s definition of materialism is inadequate without it.
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For suppose α is the class of actual fundamental properties, and that all members of
α are physical in @. Then intuitively, materialism should be true. But suppose there is a
world w where some member G of α is non-physical, and where no fundamental property not
in α is instantiated. By combinatorialism, there are many worlds that differ from w only in
the distribution of G, but not otherwise (in particular, not in whether the other fundamental
properties are physical or not). Surely, there is at least one world w′ where G is likewise
non-physical. Then w and w′ are worlds without alien properties that differ without differing
physically, and hence Lewis’s definition misclassifies @ as non-materialistic.
31Whether Lewis’s doctrine of Humean supervenience is susceptible is unclear. Perhaps a
case can be made that properties instantiated by point-sized things, or by mereological atoms,
form their own category.
32The last section of “Ramseyan Humility,” entitled “Humility about Qualia,” is a partial
defence of the anonymity constraint.
33In my metalanguage, I use ‘C’ and ‘N’ as functional expressions applying to properties
names; ‘C(F,G)’ denotes the conjunction of F and G, and ‘NF ’ the negation of F . I use
these symbols instead of more familiar negation and conjunction symbols to distinguish these
functors from the sentential connectives which are present in O.
34Or better, it is not denoted by an atomic non-logical O-term. The identity relation is
trivially definable from the class of fundamental properties and relations using the identity
predicate.
35Glanzberg [2001] discusses the great power of infinitary logics in defining supervenient
properties. See also Stalnaker [1996].
36I am assuming here that the the non-logical terms of O, if there are any, do denote.
Likewise, I am assuming in this paper that O does not contain names of individuals. Without
that assumption, Lewis argument is even more vulnerable.
37Lewis restricts the quantification to worlds in the “inner sphere of possibility,” where there
are no alien fundamental properties. But even without this restriction, Humean supervenience
does not imply structuralism.
38It goes without saying that Structuralism is not implied by any combinatorial principles
about fundamental properties. That O has predicates such as P1 to P4 is entirely compatible
with F , G, and H satisfying combinatorial principles.
39Plainly, though, the answers he surveys are not answers to the expressive skeptic’s Replace-
ment Argument, since they rely on the entertainability of the propositions whose knowability
is in question.
40In Lewis [1986a, pp. 154-5], Lewis suggests that we should be be agnostic with respect to
these two options, and argued that it is a problem for the linguistic ersatzer that she cannot
afford such agnosticim.
41“Primary intension” is David Chalmers’ term, whose Chalmers [1996, pp. 52-71] is a good
introduction to two-dimensionalism.
42This follows immediately from the semantic clause: ‘Actually S’ is true at 〈v, w〉 iff S is
true at 〈v, v〉.
43On Chalmers’ account [Chalmers, 2004, p.191], there are semantically neutral terms, whose
primary and secondary intensions coincide (ignoring the fact that primary intensions contain
centered rather than uncentered worlds). They are used in the canonical description of scenarios
(roughly, ersatz possible worlds).
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